CHEN, 28 I&N Dec. 676 (BIA 2023) | [stop-time rule] [physical presence] [

 

Matter of CHEN, 28 I&N Dec. 676 (BIA 2023)

ID 4057 (PDF)

(1) The “stop-time” rule under section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1), is not triggered by the entry of a final removal order, but rather only by service of a statutorily compliant notice to appear or the commission of specified criminal offenses, in accordance with the plain language statutory analysis provided in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) (pdf).

(2) Breaks in physical presence under section 240A(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(2), continue to be interpreted as distinct from termination of physical presence under the stop-time rule.  Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&N Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000)(pdf), followed.

(3) A respondent claiming a fundamental change in law as the basis for seeking sua sponte reopening must also establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.  Matter of G‑D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999)(pdf), followed.

Full decision Matter of CHEN [PDF]

Related:       SCOTUS Blog on Niz-Chavez v. Garland

                   Policy Memo on Migrant Immigrant Motions to Reopen